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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
COMMENTS
Fire Caused in Flight by Negligent Design-Universal Practice as
Evidence of Due Care-Refusal of Bureau of Air Commerce to Testify
to the Approved Type Certificate.-The plaintiff's airplane, made by the
defendant, took fire when in transit from Chicago to Springfield, Illinois,
and the plaintiff suffered injury from the fire; the details are not mentioned
in the report. The plaintiff's claim was based on negligence of the manufacturer-defendant in using a defective design for the airplane. The alleged
defect consisted in two principal items, first that the exhaust stacks, in projecting only one inch from the skin of the fuselage, were not long enough
to car.ry'flame or vapor far enough away into the air, and secondly, that the
carburetor drain was too short, as well as too close to the exhaust stacks;
so that, as a result of these two features, gasoline escaped from the carburetor drain pipe and adhered to the underbody of the plane, and that there
it was ignited by hot gasses from the exhaust stacks. Christine Maynard v.
Stinson Aircraft Co. (Circuit Court of Wayne Co., Michigan, date not stated;
Commerce Clearing House, Aviation Law Service, Report No. 31, Dec. 2,
1937, p. 1253).
There was expert evidence on these main items, as well as the consequent details; and the Court left the question of fact to the jury, who found
for the plaintiff in the sum of $27,500.
Two important questions of law arose:
(1) The Court charged the jury that if the construction of this plane
was "in accordance with standard and accepted practice," that fact was
evidence in favor of the defendant on the issue of due care in design, but
was not conclusive. So far so good. (Authorities cited in Wigmore on
Evidence, §461). But in concluding the charge on this rule, the Court added:
"No practice and no custom can warrant its following where that practice or
that custom can be said to be such that its following creates a hazard to
human life." And at this point the charge should have added, "where the
custom creates a hazard to human life to the knowledge or reasonable apprehension of the defendant in his experience with such design"; for otherwise
the defendant could not be said to have failed in due care. The omission of
this qualifying condition may or may not here have affected the jury's
conclusion.
(2) The second important point of law involved the refusal of the
Court to accept the approved type certificate of the Federal Bureau of Air
Commerce, as establishing that the design of the defendant's plane was "in
accordance with standard and accepted practice." This refusal was on the
facts and the law justified; but the facts were extraordinary and demand
the consideration of all persons interested in aeronautics. The facts were
these :
The defendant offered the approved type certificate, duly stamped at the
Bureau. The Court refused to accept the certificate by itself, without testimony or deposition of the person making it. This ruling was sound enough.
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At common law, no such certificates are admissible, and the State of Michigan has no statute authorizing it, nor is there a Federal statute. Of course
there ought to be; the lack of such a statute is a defect in the law-Wisconsin has such a statute.
However, the Court was ready to accept the certificate when deposed
to by the official making it, on investigation as to "what examination was
made of these precise plans that have been offered in evidence here." But
what happened when the defendant sought to take the depositions in Washington of the officials who collaborated in making the certificate? "Under
instructions from the attorney of the Secretary of Commerce," says the opinion, "the witnesses were not permitted to answer the questions whether they
ever examined these plans, or whether any one for the Department of Commerce ever made any examination of the plans, or if they did make an
examination who made it and what kind of an examination was made."
This was a most extraordinary attitude to be taken by the Department of
Commerce. The approved type certificate is a document representing the
result of the most profound research and engineering skill. Its details are
prescribed after the most exhaustive consideration, by many competent minds,
of every minute element entering into safety and efficiency of design. The
approved type certificate, is, or ought to be, the pride of the Bureau of Air
Commerce. And yet, on the facts recited in the opinion, the approved type
certificate was here treated, by the attorney for the Bureau, as if the Bureau
was ashamed of its work and was afraid to stand up for it when called
upon to explain!
Was there any government secret or confidential matter of public interest involved? How could there be? And if there was any private trade
secret of the manufacturer involved, the defendant manufacturer was here
willing to have it disclosed, in order to protect himself from a charge of
negligent designing?
We should think that airplane manufacturers would be justly dissatisfied
with this inexplicable ruling at the Bureau.
JOHN H. WIGMORE.

Ground Collision-Air Traffic Rules-Landing Plane's Right of Way
-Pilot's Negligence.-Action for damage to the plaintiff's airplane, caused
by collision on the ground with the defendant's airplane. The plaintiff's
plane was landing, the defendant's had landed, and was taxiing at a 5-mile
speed. The airN
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to point C and taxied back at 5 m. p. h. to about point D, when the defendantplane, coming in at point X, crashed into the plaintiff's left wing.
Each party testified that he did not see the other plane: Tiedt v. Gibbons
and Prosperi, C. C. H. Aviation Law Service, Report No. 31, Dec., 1937,
p. 1259 (Circuit Court of Cook Co., Illinois, Nov. 22, 1937).
To determine the respective duties of the parties, the Federal Air Traffic
Rules, par. 75 (now superseded by Civil Air Regulations, Part 60), were
introduced, giving to a landing plane the right of way over planes moving on
the ground, and concluding "but this shall not excuse the pilots of either or
both such aircraft from the exercise of due care and diligence." The Illinois
Aeronautic Commission's Regulations, par. 501, lay down the rule in identical
terms. Hence the Court had no occasion to rule on the applicability of the
Federal regulation to intra-state traffic; and it is not obvious why the counsel
for the plaintiff should have troubled to object to the admission of the
Federal regulations.
The Court laid stress on the qualifying clause of the regulation as to
the pilot's negligence superseding the right-of-way. The Court, viewing
the case from the point of time when the plaintiff's plane was approaching
point D, and the defendant's plane had landed at point X, held that the
plaintiff was then not in position to control his movements, other than by
stopping short (which he did), while the defendant plane on the contrary
was in a position to avoid the collision either by taking off again or by
moving to right or to left. Also the Court held that the defendant was
negligent in landing without looking for and seeing the plaintiff's plane
taxiing north in the defendant's direction. Thus the situation was treated
as calling for the. "last clear chance" rule in ordinary terrestrial collisions.
The Court therefore found for the plaintiff, awarding damages of $871.67
with costs.
In our opinion, the Court took a wrong view. In the first-place, the
rule for the landing plane's right of way is a primary one, fundamental to
Any qualification of it is an exception, which
all airport management.
must be clearly shown to demand application. In the next place, the plaintiff
in this case was not in a position to demand that the exception be applied in
his favor, because he himself had been the negligent cause of finding himself
in danger from the arriving plane. Note that the plaintiff, after landing
and rolling to point B, had there stopped "for two minutes, then turned and
taxied north again. From the moment he arrived at point C and stopped, he
was in complete control of his plane. From that moment, he was no longera landing plane, and had no right of way. From that moment, the duty
of foresight and the risk of harm was all on him. Did he expect to go
taxiing about the field 'ad libitum' and expecting all landing planes to keep
out of his way for the rest of the day? It was negligence on his part to
turn and proceed north as he did. Even though the defendant's plane, on
landing was negligent in not observing the approach of the plaintiff's plane,
the plaintiff's negligence was contributory, and should have barred his
recovery.
JOHN H. WIGMORE.

